Placing realism in perspective
Is there such a thing as physics beyond the Standard Model? What might dark matter and dark energy be made of? How do the answers to these questions formulated by scientists relate to the specific contexts in which they work – and what role do these contexts play in our quest for scientific knowledge? Traditionally, scientific realism is the philosophical view that sees the best theories in mature sciences as giving us an approximately true description of the way things are. But how can we expect science to describe things as they are, when we know that these descriptions are necessarily developed in a specific historical and cultural context, from a specific scientific perspective (e.g. that of contemporary particle physics and cosmology)?
A view from somewhere
“This definition of realism presupposes that there is some kind of ‘view from nowhere’ from which science can offer such an approximately true description,” explains Michela Massimi, professor of the Philosophy of Science at the University of Edinburgh. “However, scientific inquiry is always a ‘view from somewhere’: it is the product of historically and culturally situated epistemic communities that have the modelling resources, statistical tools, experimental instruments and so on to advance particular knowledge claims at their time. Scientific knowledge is always situated and perspectival knowledge.” Her Perspectival Realism (Science, Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point) project, which received funding from the European Research Council, aims to reconcile the notions of realism and perspectivism in science by rethinking what realism is about. “Perspectival Realism offers a novel view about realism in science that treats scientific knowledge production neither as the outcome of any lone genius nor as proceeding in disciplinary silos. Scientific knowledge is always the outcome of a social, multicultural and collaborative inquiry,” Massimi says. The project’s interdisciplinary approach combines the philosophy of science with scientific practice, the history of science and the history of philosophy. It pays attention to the historical and cultural contexts of scientific claims and develops a variety of realism within the bounds of a plurality of scientific perspectives.
Truth across perspectives
Massimi argues that perspectival realism is centred on the identification of ‘phenomena’, which have been reliably inferred from data. This process is always perspectival, she points out, as the inferences are drawn by particular communities at particular times. The role of these numerous – historically and culturally different – communities in knowledge production therefore needs to be reconsidered. No scientific perspective can sanction the truth of its own claims, she notes: “Claims of knowledge must instead be assessable from the point of view of other scientific perspectives. This cross-perspectival assessment is key to the notion of ‘perspectival truth’: truth across scientific perspectives.” During the fieldwork with scientists carried out under the project, the team visited CERN and the Dark Energy Survey (DES), where questions about realism translate into specific searches for new particles, including candidates for dark matter. They found that a plurality of seemingly incompatible models could in fact prove methodologically crucial to exploring new physics in such cutting-edge areas of scientific inquiry. “The philosophy of science can enter into fruitful conversations with contemporary science and offer the opportunity to collaborate with an eye to gaining a better understanding about the methodological assumptions behind scientific knowledge production,” Massimi concludes.
Keywords
Perspectival Realism, philosophy of science, scientific realism, scientific perspective, epistemic communities, scientific knowledge, perspectival truth, Dark Energy Survey, dark matter, physics beyond the Standard Model
