Periodic Reporting for period 3 - POPREBEL (Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism)
Reporting period: 2021-10-01 to 2022-12-31
The problem being addressed
POPREBEL project is designed to address one of the most pressing issues of our time: the rise of right-wing populism. We take stock of this phenomenon – in its various forms – in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and describe it, create a typology of its various manifestations, investigate its causes, interpret its meanings, diagnose its consequences, and propose policy solutions. Our focus is on the CEE region, but we offer comparative insights that could help to shed new light on populism in other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe.
Importance for society
Populism, particularly its right-wing variety, constitutes the most serious threat to democracy in the twenty-first century. Economic crises (particularly the 2008 one), the sense of cultural unmooring, and multiple political upheavals have brought to the forefront of public life right-wing populists whose commitment to the procedures of democracy is tepid if not outright hostile. As a result, the process of democratic backsliding has commenced, and it leads – as many researchers demonstrate – to the weakening of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism or democratic-autoritarian hybrids.
The consequences for Europe may be serious. As the EU is trying to come to terms with Brexit and the general sense of malaise, the rise of right-wing populism spells trouble. The rightward reorientation of the political scene can destabilise domestic politics in several countries, undermine the established ways of doing business among European partners and lead to the rise of ‘uncivilised’ political behaviour and even violence. It is therefore imperative to produce clear and empirically well-founded diagnosis of the phenomenon and devise educational plans that will make people aware of the danger. It is equally important to supply well-crafted analyses for civil society activists and politicians who are ready to fight for the future of liberal democracy.
Overall objectives
1.To prepare a comprehensive portrayal of the rise of populism, particularly in CEE, drawing on sources, methods and models from various disciplines; 2. To provide a mirror in which other parts of Europe can catch a reflection of themselves as they are dealing with the rise of populism; 3. To develop and apply a new tool of online ethnography that allows us to gauge people’s thoughts and sentiments that underpin their support for or rejection of populism.
POPREBEL project is designed to address one of the most pressing issues of our time: the rise of right-wing populism. We take stock of this phenomenon – in its various forms – in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and describe it, create a typology of its various manifestations, investigate its causes, interpret its meanings, diagnose its consequences, and propose policy solutions. Our focus is on the CEE region, but we offer comparative insights that could help to shed new light on populism in other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe.
Importance for society
Populism, particularly its right-wing variety, constitutes the most serious threat to democracy in the twenty-first century. Economic crises (particularly the 2008 one), the sense of cultural unmooring, and multiple political upheavals have brought to the forefront of public life right-wing populists whose commitment to the procedures of democracy is tepid if not outright hostile. As a result, the process of democratic backsliding has commenced, and it leads – as many researchers demonstrate – to the weakening of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism or democratic-autoritarian hybrids.
The consequences for Europe may be serious. As the EU is trying to come to terms with Brexit and the general sense of malaise, the rise of right-wing populism spells trouble. The rightward reorientation of the political scene can destabilise domestic politics in several countries, undermine the established ways of doing business among European partners and lead to the rise of ‘uncivilised’ political behaviour and even violence. It is therefore imperative to produce clear and empirically well-founded diagnosis of the phenomenon and devise educational plans that will make people aware of the danger. It is equally important to supply well-crafted analyses for civil society activists and politicians who are ready to fight for the future of liberal democracy.
Overall objectives
1.To prepare a comprehensive portrayal of the rise of populism, particularly in CEE, drawing on sources, methods and models from various disciplines; 2. To provide a mirror in which other parts of Europe can catch a reflection of themselves as they are dealing with the rise of populism; 3. To develop and apply a new tool of online ethnography that allows us to gauge people’s thoughts and sentiments that underpin their support for or rejection of populism.
The work of the project was organised in eight work packages
WP1 Key concepts. After developing the two key concepts, neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism, we use them to capture the essence of social and cultural transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of right-wing populism. Our empirical case studies, on religion and nationalism, national mythology, connections between anti-migrant sentiments and neo-traditional interpretations of the national community, confirm their analytical value.
WP2 Participatory online conversation (ethnography). Our large-scale online conversation on East European populism, across different languages, was enriched with online ethnographic fieldwork in Poland, Czechia and Germany, which generated a large ethnographic corpus. In all three countries, we discover a high degree of both polarisation and emotional attachment to people’s identities. Our study revealed also that concrete concepts whose meanings are commonly imagined to be universal (for example, “freedom”) are deeply splintered and become carriers of meanings that are particularised and sometimes antithetical. The three country comparison confirmed the existence of a deep sense of fatigue and disappointment with governments.
WP3 Culture. We demonstrated that right-wing populists, particularly when they have power, make enormous efforts to capture as many institutions of cultural production as they can. Once they gain control over such institutions they exploit them to propagate a neo-traditional vision of the world that they also use to claim legitimacy for their power.
WP4 Politics. We constructed a large, comprehensible database of political and economic indicators relevant for the study of the rise of populism, that was then used to show that, for example, economic factors alone are insufficient to explain the rise of support for right-wing populism. We have also conducted a number of case studies, for example on: Czech populism, long-term populist trends in Yugoslav/post-Yugoslav politics, a comparison of regime performance and support for populist parties in CEE, and populist imageries in geopolitics.
WP5 Economy. The work in the economic package focused on two main themes: the causes of support for populist parties and politicians and the economic effects of populist rule. Our analysis of the economic roots and policy consequences of populism, relied heavily on the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ distinction. Our approach to the effects of the populist rule was built on another key distinction between economic populism and political-ideological populism.
WP6: Foresight scenarios. This sub-project was designed to be primarily a tool for communication, reflection, and interaction. While scenarios are built on social science knowledge of causal processes in society, they provoke people to look into the future using knowledge from the past. Despite the external shocks (the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine) the project did achieve its goal of continuing conversations, in the project and beyond, about the future of populism. And it was successful in transmitting these insights also to external audiences, particularly during the very last engagement seminar.
WP7 Communication and dissemination. Despite COVID-related travel restrictions, we managed to disseminate our results to broad academic and non-academic audiences. In the second half of 2022, we organised or co-organised three major public events that engaged policymakers, public officials, civil society activists and a good number of interested citizens.
WP8 Management. The management team kept the project on track, often in creative ways, working in the extremely difficult and changing conditions brought on by the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
WP1 Key concepts. After developing the two key concepts, neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism, we use them to capture the essence of social and cultural transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of right-wing populism. Our empirical case studies, on religion and nationalism, national mythology, connections between anti-migrant sentiments and neo-traditional interpretations of the national community, confirm their analytical value.
WP2 Participatory online conversation (ethnography). Our large-scale online conversation on East European populism, across different languages, was enriched with online ethnographic fieldwork in Poland, Czechia and Germany, which generated a large ethnographic corpus. In all three countries, we discover a high degree of both polarisation and emotional attachment to people’s identities. Our study revealed also that concrete concepts whose meanings are commonly imagined to be universal (for example, “freedom”) are deeply splintered and become carriers of meanings that are particularised and sometimes antithetical. The three country comparison confirmed the existence of a deep sense of fatigue and disappointment with governments.
WP3 Culture. We demonstrated that right-wing populists, particularly when they have power, make enormous efforts to capture as many institutions of cultural production as they can. Once they gain control over such institutions they exploit them to propagate a neo-traditional vision of the world that they also use to claim legitimacy for their power.
WP4 Politics. We constructed a large, comprehensible database of political and economic indicators relevant for the study of the rise of populism, that was then used to show that, for example, economic factors alone are insufficient to explain the rise of support for right-wing populism. We have also conducted a number of case studies, for example on: Czech populism, long-term populist trends in Yugoslav/post-Yugoslav politics, a comparison of regime performance and support for populist parties in CEE, and populist imageries in geopolitics.
WP5 Economy. The work in the economic package focused on two main themes: the causes of support for populist parties and politicians and the economic effects of populist rule. Our analysis of the economic roots and policy consequences of populism, relied heavily on the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ distinction. Our approach to the effects of the populist rule was built on another key distinction between economic populism and political-ideological populism.
WP6: Foresight scenarios. This sub-project was designed to be primarily a tool for communication, reflection, and interaction. While scenarios are built on social science knowledge of causal processes in society, they provoke people to look into the future using knowledge from the past. Despite the external shocks (the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine) the project did achieve its goal of continuing conversations, in the project and beyond, about the future of populism. And it was successful in transmitting these insights also to external audiences, particularly during the very last engagement seminar.
WP7 Communication and dissemination. Despite COVID-related travel restrictions, we managed to disseminate our results to broad academic and non-academic audiences. In the second half of 2022, we organised or co-organised three major public events that engaged policymakers, public officials, civil society activists and a good number of interested citizens.
WP8 Management. The management team kept the project on track, often in creative ways, working in the extremely difficult and changing conditions brought on by the Covid pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
By contrast to most existing studies, we treat populism not just as a political occurrence, but also as a socio-cultural phenomenon with complex roots in cultural and economic transformations of the last quarter of the century at least. Before we embarked on the empirical studies in several countries, we created a conceptual scaffold built around two concepts: neo-feudalism and neo-traditionalism. Using these concepts we are able to show that a specific type of economic system that populists build, neo-feudal capitalism, is legitimated by their skilful invocation of neo-traditionalism. This cultural formation, related to illiberalism and conservatism, legitimises favouring outcomes rather than procedures of the political processes, prioritises protection of a (national) collective rather than an individual; and champions ‘traditional’ social – particularly gender – roles. As our massive and innovative online ethnography has demonstrated, all of this transpires in societies whose many members are disaffected and often angry at their governments perceived as unable to deal with the most basic and important necessities of life.