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Note

*This deliverable is subject to final acceptance by the European Commission.*

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# Response to the review result letter

We are delighted that our work on the Governance Handbook for PETRA is appreciated highly. It encouraged us to seek a broader audience via the construction on a website, which we are currently finalising. Apart from the positive feedback the report contained some remarks on differences between the DOW and the deliverable.

The Governance Handbook is approved, but is found subject to changes and resubmission. The changes refer to four issues:

1. “The first kind (organisation models) specifies the organisation structures required for long term cooperation, and identifies the formal responsibilities and task distribution of the stakeholders. Public and private collaboration or participation should also be considered.”
2. “The second kind (transaction models) analyses the formal relations within a legal framework including contracts, agreements and covenants. The transaction models involve generally bilateral relations between public and private participants, private to private participants, public to public participants, participants and users, etc.”
3. “The influence of the organisation models to the transaction models should also be analysed.”
4. “The proposed models should be evaluated through their application in the pilot runs.”

This note serves as a bridge between these four issues from the DOW and the Governance Handbook.

According to the report, the main omission was a discussion of organisation and transaction models. This hasn’t been done as explicitly as suggested in the DOW. This presumed difference has its origin in the way we worked on the project. During the development of the DOW we assumed the following:

* The best way to typify smart mobility platforms is by their formalized structure and contracts. These would be visible and it is relatively easy to compare them.
* It is possible to separate organizational models and transaction models.

During our study we found that many platforms are still in their infancy. Many platforms exist, few of them are multi-modal and almost none of them serve as serious policy instruments. These extra features were under development. As a consequence, the formal models didn’t tell us enough about the profiles of the platforms. The informal organization and transactions would give better profiles.

For this reason we took a broader perspective than presented in the DOW. We included more organizational models than just formal structures. And we included more transaction models than just the contracts.

We also found that the conceptual separation of organizational models and transaction models did not improve our understanding of the governance challenges we proposed to study. Especially from the dominant perspective of PETRA – that is the designer’s perspective – organization and transaction appeared to be intertwined. For a designer it is not fruitful to design transactions without minding existing organization models and these organizational models are unique because of their legal position in a city or country. As a consequence we took the relation between organizations and institutions to the core of our work and frame it as a problem for designers.

This broader perspective and reframing obscured some elements in the DOW somewhat. We however addressed the elements in the Handbook. Under here we will provide a guide to the Handbook with the DOW- elements as starting point.

# 1: Organization models

The organization models are central to our interpretation of governance. We have interpreted governance with the help of three classic theoretical organization models: hierarchy, market and network (2.3). We specified these models with a state of the art about platform governance (2.4). This state of the art focuses on formal ownership and control. This didn’t really fit our broader governance interpretation (including markets and hierarchies). In other words: how does power find its way through different levels of government that are involved in platforms, both in a formal and in an informal sense (2.7)?

Our empirical study involved the elements “organisation and management” and financial questions about initial investment and source of funding. We have described four organizational models (3.14) and elaborated on their implications on centrality (3.15) and dedication (3.18).

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| Theoretical columns | 2.3 Three governance modes: hierarchy, market, network  2.4 Information platform governance: three interpretations  2.7 Multi-level governance: layers of authority as problem and as solution for smart mobility |
| Empirical columns | 3.14 The organizational setting of journey planning platforms  3.15 Overseeing it all? The centrality paradox for smart city projects  3.18 Only for you: the organization of love and dedication |
| Fact sheets criteria | Organisation and management  Initial investment  Source of funding |

*Table 1: The main sections addressing organizational models*

# 2: Transaction models

We elaborated on transactions in a public-private setting, where hierarchy, market and network mechanisms are all present at the same time. In this setting we have asked ourselves how public values are secured if ownership of data and infrastructures may be private (2.6). This question is addressed in the policy route, which is a chain of theoretical columns and empirical columns, including a synthesis.

More specifically, we addressed assessment criteria (3.3), public-private interaction regarding contracting (3.16) and contracting regarding data ownership (3.22). The latter column is based on our empirical question about data flows in platforms, as can be found in the fact sheets.

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| Theoretical columns | 2.6 Public values: why they are important and hard to secure |
| Empirical columns | 3.3 Assessing right now: gains, costs and the traveller’s logic  3.16 Contracting out smart mobility: the problem of integration and accountability  3.22 PETRA breathing: data in and data out |
| Fact sheets criteria | Organisation and management  Data flow |

*Table 2: The man sections addressing transaction models*

# 3: The influence of the organisation models to the transaction models

We took the interaction between organization models and transaction models to the core of our work. Both are institutions that guide behaviour of all stakeholders involved. We defined an (idealtypical) ‘governance designer’ as a problem owner that really try to influence behaviour with the help of institutions (2.5). The main challenges for this governance designer are addressed in the “governance-by-design route”. All columns on this route are relevant. More specifically, we have developed five platform governance models and reflected on the governance challenges that are likely to appear per model.

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| Theoretical columns | 2.5 Guiding behaviour: designing institutions for smart mobility |
| Empirical columns | All columns on the “Governance-by-design route”  4.2 Five data platform models and their consequences for governance  4.3 Synthesis Governance-by-design route |

*Table 3: The main sections addressing the relation between organisation models and transaction models*

# 4: Proposed models and their applications in the cases

In the governance handbook, we have developed several models for a mobility data platform. The four governance models that we proposed are stated below. Here we make specific what the advantages and disadvantages were as they were discovered in the demonstrators.

* Dedicated agency for the platform, which we saw in the cases in for example CarFreeAtoZ. This is an agency with no other purpose than developing and providing the platform, generally for a or multiple governmental clients. This was not applied in any of the three demonstrators, although the Venice demonstrator in the early stages of the project comes closest, with the orator being a separate entity that would drive the platform. However, from another perspective we could argue that the implementation of the PETRA platform, as it was developed by the project team, did so, as the governance was locally still being built up at the three demonstrators.   
  The key advantage of this model in the demonstrators was the ready availability of specific data sets and a dedicated infrastructure available to have the platform up and running locally. However, this model also had very specific disadvantages. The agency lacks a wider embedding in the regional governmental basis. It proved difficult in the Venice demonstrator to get to other forms of data that were not directly available to the operator. Their request to others were not supported by existing hierarchy. Data provision for example by policy proved difficult. This only changed when a wider embedding was sought in the later stages of the project.  
  This means that this model can work well if data is used that is widely available, for example through open data or through linking f the users, like the CarFreeAtoZ. In those cases, this model can work well. However, in our evaluation it is not a very effective model towards an effective governance for a mobility data platform.
* Dedicated association between transport authorities and operators, which we saw in the cases in for example VSS and OV9292, but also the Vienna case has elements of this. This is a cooperation between one or multiple transport authorities and the operators to together develop and sustain the platform. One could argue that the Venice demonstrator in the later stages of the project comes closest, although the role of the single transport authority was still underdeveloped in that and only one operator was included.  
  The model showed in the cases to provide a stable basis for the governance of the mobility data platform. In these cases, the cooperation was set up purposefully to develop the platform. The governance of the mobility data platform was captured in the governance of the association, with membership of key data providers and users of the data. It provided easier access to a wider set of data than the dedicated agency which had a looser coupling to government agencies and operators. In the demonstrator in Venice in the later years of the project, we saw the lack of this governance made it difficult to get to the right data and to combine the data in the platform. Also, the loose relation between authority and operator meant that nudging was hard to implement. The Venice demonstrator eventually was successful in implementing the platform for tourists, showing that governance (although more informal governance) was eventually built up enough to start sharing the data and develop the platform.
* Transport authority, which we saw in the Haifa demonstrator. In this case, the transport authority of the region is developing the mobility data platform. We saw cases like this in Melbourne and London. The success of this model is highly dependent on the exiting relation between the transport authority and the operator. The key advantage above the dedicated agency and the association is a real embedding in the key governmental organisation, which allows for the ready availability of a wider set of local data, beyond what is available at the operator. The governance structure is there to bring that data together quickly. The demonstrator in Haifa made clear that the success of this model is dependent on the existing relation between the operator and the authority. If the operator is under hierarchical of market control from the authority, and that control relation has developed a sound governance around the mobility data platform, the model can work well. In the demonstrator in Haifa, this was not the case; the operators had contracts with the national transport authority, rather than with the metropolitan transport authority. With the absent governance relations developing the relation with the operators was difficult to begin with. However, other cases showed that when the contract between operator and authority is clear on data delivery, possibilities of nudging etc., this model could work well.
* Metropolitan authority, which we saw in the case in Lyon and in the Rome demonstrator. In these cases, a more generic metropolitan authority exists, with responsibilities beyond transport. This allows the platform to operate not just on transport, but also on environmental and health goals. In Rome, the governance structure was in place that was able to gather a wider focus. However, in its first form, the focus was kept on transport. The complexity of developing the platform drove a primary focus on transport issues. Possibly in later stages the widening of the focus, for example through nudging for more healthy travel behaviour would be easier to implement as an addition. In the three years of the project, that was not established, but the broader topics were more on the agenda then in other of the demonstrators.

To conclude, various of the models have advantages and disadvantages. An existing governance structure covering the relation between public transport operators and authorities obviously helps gathering data and find purpose for that data in the field of transport policy. However, it diminishes the purposefulness of the governance structure in providing a flexible and dedicated organisation for the mobility data platform. The former forms are more dedicated and purposeful and as such flexible. That later models provide more accessibility to data and direct use of the platform, but can be more cumbersome when the mobility data platform is not a priority in this organisation.